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David Foster Wallace and Lovelessness
David P. Rando
It has become a critical axiom that in his fiction David Foster Wallace 
turns irony inside out in order to express genuine emotion. “Wallace con-
ceives a treatment for contemporary American solipsism that is drenched 
in hip irony and negates the ‘Other’” (143), Petrus van Ewijk writes, 
while Paul Giles observes that Wallace “turns . . . irony back against the 
postmodern condition itself,” an “ironization of irony [that] leaves scope 
for tantalizing glimpses of authentic experience” (340). Similarly, Marshall 
Boswell argues, “hip irony is itself ironized in such a way that the opposite 
of hip irony—that is, gooey sentiment—can emerge as the work’s indi-
rectly intended mode” (17).
 While there is much to encourage such views, including Wallace’s 
own essays and interviews—indeed, hip irony and gooey sentiment are 
Wallace’s own terms (“E” 63, Infinite 694)—insufficient attention has been 
paid to the lack of emotion structuring his fiction, especially given the 
ways Wallace’s fiction is crucially invested in affectlessness, most memo-
rably perhaps in the character of Infinite Jest’s Hal Incandenza, whose 
“anhedonia” is described as “a kind of radical abstracting of everything, a 
hollowing out of stuff that used to have affective content” (693). Infinite 
Jest also ties this condition of affectlessness to an ironic aesthetic: “It’s of 
some interest that the lively arts of the millennial U.S.A. treat anhedonia 
and internal emptiness as hip and cool”; they guide us “to fashion masks 
of ennui and jaded irony” (694), and eventually these masks get “stuck 
there.” The myth about Wallace’s fiction, which Wallace himself helped 
to originate and his critics often reproduce, is that his texts put on these 
ironic masks only to ironize them, and in doing so they reclaim a space 
for affect and sentiment. Critics have not sufficiently challenged Wallace’s 
categories, however, and have too often reproduced his own thought 
patterns.1 They do not quite make clear how it is that the masks become 
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unstuck, how irony can be ironized so that unironic sentiment can find 
expression without in fact compounding irony so that it goes, as it were, 
all the way down. For this reason, I argue it is time to reevaluate the place 
of affect in Wallace’s fiction as well as to reconsider the critical readings 
that tend to privilege affect over affectlessness and sentiment over irony.
 We might begin by questioning Wallace’s opposition of irony and 
sentiment—or rather by observing how his own formulations challenge 
this opposition. It is true that in “E. Unibus Pluram,” for example, irony 
seems to have become a generalized protective response against appearing 
naïve or sentimental: “The new rebels might be artists willing to risk the 
yawn, the rolled eyes, the cool smile, the nudged ribs, the parody of the 
gifted ironists, the ‘Oh how banal.’ To risk accusations of sentimentality, 
melodrama” (81). Similarly, in Infinite Jest, we see that “Hal, who’s empty 
but not dumb, theorizes privately that what passes for hip cynical tran-
scendence of sentiment is really some kind of fear of being really human” 
(694-95). Such passages seem to oppose sentiment to irony. But we might 
also reflect on how, as Wallace represents it, this opposition seems to fall 
apart: rather than a mere turning away from naïve emotion, irony can also 
be described as a product of emotion, specifically the emotions of anxiety 
or fear about emotional vulnerability itself, or even “a fear of being re-
ally human.”  To the extent that Wallace formulates irony as a product 
of anxiety or fear, there is indeed something rather melodramatic about 
irony itself that makes it impossible to separate it from sentiment. In other 
words, sentiment and melodrama cannot be constructed as binary alterna-
tives to cool irony if the equally powerful emotions of anxiety and fear are 
preconditions for irony in the first instance. If cool irony is shot through 
with melodramatic emotion, however, the collapse of their opposition cuts 
in both directions: if irony cannot be separated from the emotion it wishes 
to escape, sincere emotion cannot emerge from an irony itself defined as 
an emotional response functioning to protect against the very feelings by 
which it was prompted. Though this conceptual collapse of the sentiment-
irony opposition has gone generally unrecognized by Wallace’s critics, it 
nonetheless plays out on different levels of his fiction. What Wallace does 
best is to dramatize as vividly and with as much pathos as anybody before 
him the struggle and failure to differentiate gooey sentiment from the 
sentiment of irony.
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 Contrary to the tendency to privilege apparently unironic moments 
of sentiment plucked from Wallace’s texts, I want to step back and ob-
serve the larger patterns and structures that suggest instead a continuous 
struggle to overcome irony that ultimately fails. There is no better way to 
do this than by tracking one of  Wallace’s persistent preoccupations: the 
sentiment of love and love’s absence. Indeed lovelessness may be the major 
concern of Wallace’s work. Both Infinite Jest and its eponymous film re-
volve around the presence or absence of a mother’s love. With the excep-
tion of Mario, the entire Incandenza family is disfigured by its members’ 
failure to feel love or to express love. In The Pale King, Lane Dean, having 
impregnated Sheri Fisher, asks himself “why is he so sure that he doesn’t 
love her? Why is one kind of love any different? What if he has no earthly 
idea what love is?” (43). In “Good Old Neon” from Oblivion and “Brief 
Interview #20” from Brief Interviews with Hideous Men, characters have 
epiphanies about their own lovelessness, their inability to love or even to 
understand what love is. 
 Indeed, in the following it is primarily through these two stories that 
I examine Wallace’s fiction’s lack of emotion, especially its lovelessness on 
the levels of story and discourse. Considering the ways in which their 
ironic form can itself be viewed as a kind of lovelessness complicates the 
common view of affect’s place in Wallace’s fiction. While Wallace’s char-
acters often remain loveless because of their fear of emotional connection, 
these values are mirrored on the level of literary form as well, in narrative 
structures that constantly undercut unironic sentiment. Irony on the level 
of discourse is thus enmeshed with lovelessness on the level of story, as 
Wallace views both as anxious or fearful alternatives to the powerful feel-
ings associated with sentimentality and melodrama. Recognizing in his 
work the importance, not of affect and love, but of affectlessness and love-
lessness reveals that if  Wallace’s writing is itself affecting, it is not because 
it discovers an alchemical way of transmuting postmodern irony into 
golden sentiment, but because it so vividly stages the chemical covalence 
of love and fear. Contrary to dominant emotional triumphalist readings 
of  Wallace, therefore, I will argue that the very failure of love to emerge 





The key coordinate for Wallace’s representation of love and lovelessness is 
James Joyce. Like Wallace’s, Joyce’s world is peopled with characters unable 
to love: James Duffy, Little Chandler, Gabriel Conroy, and more. Perhaps 
Stephen Dedalus fits this loveless mold as well, as he rejects Cranly and 
his father, and feels haunted by the ghost of a mother who loved him but 
for whom he could not be moved to pray. Wallace’s treatment of loveless-
ness is a Joycean legacy: the whole of Infinite Jest might be regarded as an 
elaborate and ironic gloss on Stephen Dedalus’s meditation on “mother 
love” in Ulysses—“Amor matris, subjective and objective genitive, may be 
the only true thing in life” (9.842-43)—or on Cranly’s view in A Portrait 
of the Artist as a Young Man that, “Whatever else is unsure in this stinking 
dunghill of a world a mother’s love is not” (213), though Infinite Jest in-
novates on this theme by imagining the way in which a mother might 
literally love a child to death. Stephen Burn has noted that Infinite Jest 
“is stalked by the ghost of a tall alcoholic author named Jim” (20). Burn 
correctly estimates Joyce’s importance to Wallace. In fact, as when “the 
ghostish figure that’s been flickering in and out of sight around the room 
finally stays in one spot long enough for Gately to really check him out” 
(Infinite 829),Wallace’s fiction crystallizes his relationship with Joyce at 
certain crucial moments of “a sort of epiphanyish visitation” (833). 
 One such set of moments occurs when Wallace rewrites the epiphany 
of lovelessness that concludes “The Dead.” When Gabriel learns about 
Michael Furey’s sacrifice for Gabriel’s own wife, his eyes fill with “gener-
ous tears. He had never felt like that himself towards any woman but he 
knew that such feeling must be love” (194). “Brief Interview #20” and 
“Good Old Neon” contain nearly identical moments. “Brief Interview 
#20,” conducted on “12-96” and thus sharing a Christmas/New Year’s 
setting with Joyce’s story, likely set during the Feast of Epiphany in early 
January, builds toward such a moment, though with considerably more 
self-consciousness about doing so:2 “I realized I had never loved anyone. 
Isn’t that trite? Like a canned line?” (313). This realization is evoked by a 
story about abduction, rape, and near murder told by a woman the inter-
viewee has picked up for a one-night stand (I will take a risk and call this 
interviewee a law student, since we know he is a graduate student [289], 
alludes to his friend’s torts study group [283], and uses legalistic rhetoric). 
Like Gabriel, the unnamed speaker “focused very intently on her story” 
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(310) and “began to cry at the anecdote’s climax” (316). Similarly, the 
speaker who considers himself a fraud in “Good Old Neon” says, “the idea 
struck me that maybe the real root of my problem was not fraudulence 
but a basic inability to really love” (165).
 The horror of lovelessness is a consistent thread in Wallace’s writing. 
Reviewing Toward the End of Time, for instance, Wallace criticizes John 
Updike’s male “emotional solipsists”: “Though usually family men, they 
never really love anybody—and, though always heterosexual to the point 
of satyriasis, they especially don’t love women” (“Certainly” 53). Wallace 
contrasts Updike’s preoccupations with a set of fears whose difference 
Wallace describes as generational, but which nonetheless are also espe-
cially his own: “today’s subforties have very different horrors, prominent 
among which are anomie and solipsism and a peculiarly American loneli-
ness: the prospect of dying without even once having loved something 
more than yourself ” (54). Although this horror of lovelessness could apply 
equally to both men and women, and critics have surely privileged ques-
tions of maternal love in his texts, as the title of Brief Interviews suggests, 
Wallace’s work is also peculiarly invested in diagnosing male lovelessness 
as a form of hideousness. 
 By at least the 1980s, deriving insight from feminist theory, critics had 
similarly begun to attribute hideous qualities to Gabriel Conroy, revising 
what Vincent Cheng has called the hitherto “Authorized Version” of Ga-
briel, which understood him as a fundamentally decent but flawed man 
“who nevertheless in the end arrives at a deeply moving and universal, 
humanizing epiphany” (129). In contrast to this view, for instance, Cheng 
sees Gabriel as “a potentially oppressive patriarch in symbolic collabora-
tion with the ruling masters of the English colonial empire” (135). Ruth 
Bauerle focuses on Gabriel’s lovelessness when she suggests that a possible 
outcome of Gretta’s story might be a journey westward that “could free 
Gretta from Gabriel’s unfeeling lust, as it could free Gabriel to experi-
ence deep love” (118). In a spirit similar to critical revisions such as these, 
Wallace rewrites “The Dead” so that what is most hideous about such 
characters is precisely their masculine lovelessness. Wallace suggests that 
lovelessness is hideous by associating its revelation with fear and horror, 
terms that suggest Aristotelian tragic catharsis, as when the law student 
accounts for his epiphany: “I began in the dark of our room to feel terrible 
sadness and fear. I felt as though there had been far more genuine emo-
580
David P. Rando
tion in and connection in that anti-rape she suffered than in any of the 
so-called lovemaking I spent my time pursuing” (312, emphasis added).
 The revelation of lovelessness in “Brief Interview #20” and “The 
Dead” results in each case from four primary conditions. First, there is a 
mechanism in each story in which the revelation of lovelessness is made 
through the man’s homosocial preoccupations with and reflections on 
other men in the woman’s narrative, which thus mediates between them. 
In “Brief Interview #20” and “The Dead” the men see themselves in rela-
tion to past men who have also been involved with the respective woman: 
for Gabriel, Michael Furey, and for the law student, the rapist/murderer. 
In Gabriel’s case the homosocial relation with Michael Furey is one of 
perceived contrast between the passionless analyst and the self-sacrificing 
lover. By measuring his position within the theoretical love triangle he 
and Michael Furey form with Gretta, Gabriel is forced to recognize his 
own lovelessness. The structure is much the same in “Brief Interview 
#20,” but rather than perceiving contrast with the other man, the law 
student finds a horrifying similarity to the loveless rapist who objectifies 
and murders women as a substitute for love relationships that would be 
unthinkably engulfing. Consistent with Eve Sedgwick’s model of ho-
mosociality, the women are treated as conduits through which Gabriel 
and the law student can puzzle out their relationships to the men who 
preceded them. We can see, however, that these women are hardly passive 
conduits, but rather powerful conductors (or perhaps orchestrators) who, 
as storytellers, act as conduits in the root sense: to “bring together.” 
 Although “Good Old Neon” does not conform to the established 
pattern in which a male character arrives at a sudden understanding of 
his own lovelessness by listening to a story told by a woman about her 
experience with another man, there is still a homosocial element at work 
in this story. In a Cheers rerun, Lilith’s3 offhand comment—“If I have one 
more yuppie come in and start whining to me about how he can’t love, 
I’m going to throw up” (168)—to Frasier, the other man in this televisual 
triangle, devastates the narrator. His own agonizing and apparently irre-
solvable condition is represented as a joke, the loveless yuppie reduced to 
a stock type millions of Americans will immediately find funny: “I was 
nothing but just another fast-track yuppie who couldn’t love, and . . . I 
found the banality of this unendurable” (173). Like the law student of 
“Brief Interview #20,” he “recognized what a cliché and melodramatic 
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type of complaint the inability-to-love concept was” (168), and in a 
“flash,” “it more or less destroyed me, that’s the only way I can describe 
it” (169).
 The second condition for the revelation of lovelessness is that the man 
tends to infantilize the woman, and generally views women typologically. 
In “The Dead” and “Brief Interview #20,” the male characters’ infantiliza-
tion of women is the base condition that prompts the discovery of their 
own lovelessness. Noting the way Gabriel accounts for their late arrival 
by telling his aunts that Gretta “takes three mortal hours to dress herself ” 
(“Dead” 153), Cheng argues that his “seemingly good-humored comment 
suggests . . . an essentializing of the female in the form of infantilization” 
(135). Similarly, the law student admits that it is “exceedingly hard to take 
[women of the “Cruncher genus”] seriously” (289). Such infantilization 
is related to a persistent “typological” imagination of women, as in the 
law student’s classification of women into various genera (289-90). While 
Gabriel Conroy appears to classify women less consciously, he too views 
them typologically. His aunts are “two ignorant old women” (167); he 
treats Gretta (whom Gabriel’s mother uncomfortably classed as a “country 
cute” [162]) and Molly Ivors (“thoughttormented” [177]) quite differently 
according to how he perceives their geographical origins, educations, and 
occupations. In fact, the interviewer of “Brief Interview #20” seems to 
be the equivalent “type” for Molly Ivors in Wallace’s story, a politically 
informed woman whose response to his story the narrator constantly tries 
to gauge and co-opt. Throughout, the law student attempts to preempt 
the feminist interpretation to which he imagines the interviewer will 
subject his story by formulating it himself. This mechanism sets up the 
story’s vulgar ending, so different from the lyrical conclusion of “The 
Dead.” Betraying his own inability to control the interpretation of his 
narrative, he finally tries to silence the woman:4 “Judge me, you chilly 
cunt. You dyke, you bitch, cooze, cunt, slut, gash. Happy now?” (318).
 The third crucial part of this pattern is that the male infantilization 
of women is surprisingly defied by each woman’s powerful act of story-
telling. Indeed, at the root of infantilizing typologies of women in these 
stories may be the issue of speech and speechlessness (“infant” derives 
from “unable to speak”). The law student views his object as only a one-
night stand in part because of “the grim unimaginability of having to talk 
with a New Age brigadier for more than one night” (289). Gabriel feels 
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most favorably toward Gretta when she is silent and “listening to distant 
music” (182); when he aestheticizes her in that posture, painting her in his 
mind as Distant Music, he begins to lust for her. As Margot Norris writes, 
“Gabriel’s story [is] told in what we might call the audible or ‘loud’ text, 
with a largely silent but disruptive feminist countertext” (98). What even-
tually stun Gabriel and the law student into their respective epiphanies 
are the anecdotes that Gretta and the unnamed woman unexpectedly tell. 
Shockingly, the “infants” speak. When the women of Joyce’s and Wallace’s 
stories speak, it is with devastating power that exposes the male characters’ 
understandings of the histories of their lovers as false, but also cuts through 
their own basic self-conceptions, forcing each to acknowledge with shock 
that he has been living a life of self-deception.
 In these narratives it is crucial that the form of the woman’s story is 
indeed an “anecdote,” the word with which Wallace’s student continu-
ally classifies the woman’s story. Here the anecdote emerges as a nar-
rative form inimical to cliché and resistant to the stale conventions of 
melodrama. These anecdotes work against the buffer that forms when 
powerful feelings, through repetition, have become clichés. When the 
law student coaches the interviewer about how to receive the anecdote, 
he issues metafictional instructions to readers as well: “I’m well aware 
that what she is about to describe is nothing but a variant of the stale old 
Love Will Conquer All bromide but for the moment bracket whatever 
contempt you might feel and try to see the more concrete ramifications” 
(300). Gretta’s power as a storyteller issues from the way her anecdote 
unexpectedly reaches past her husband’s multiform defenses (at first Ga-
briel responds “coldly” (190) and with “irony” (191) and “sarcasm”). The 
anecdotal form helps to bracket ironic reactions to cliché, to reinstall the 
epiphanic where for too long there has only been the melodramatic. The 
anecdote can thus be defined as a potential antidote to the listener’s rote 
contempt for cliché. 
 Finally, in each story, the epiphany of lovelessness is not only prompt-
ed by an infantilized woman and her anecdote about, or comment to, 
another man, but is always also closely linked to death. Gabriel’s epiphany 
concludes with his famous vision of death: “His soul had approached that 
region where dwell the vast hosts of the dead” (194). The law student 
begins by claiming, “And yet I did not fall in love with her until she had 
related the story of the unbelievably horrifying incident in which she 
was brutally accosted and held captive and nearly killed” (287). Gretta 
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describes a young man who died for her while the law student’s lover 
details how she nearly died at the hands of her rapist. These anecdotes af-
fect the men in part from their proximity to death, suggesting that death 
and lovelessness are closely associated. Consistent with Infinite Jest, “Brief 
Interview #20” links death and women.
 With respect to “The Dead” and “Brief Interview #20,” the generic 
innovation of “Good Old Neon” is to present the epiphany of loveless-
ness as exactly congruent to death. Instead of being merely proximate to 
the revelation of lovelessness, in “Good Old Neon” death becomes the 
mode of revelation itself, “more like the sudden internal flash or whatever 
of epiphany or insight” (167), the “flash like neon” (179n) from which 
the story takes its title. In this much more extreme equation, because the 
speaker is frustratingly unable to shepherd his experiences around the 
obstacles of cliché and melodrama (176), he resorts to suicide as a mode 
of communication. “Good Old Neon” proposes death as a solution for 
language’s great inarticulateness, its inability to communicate life’s most 
meaningful experiences. Wallace figures this dilemma by imagining 
that inside each person is “this enormous room full of what seems like 
everything in the whole universe” (178), and yet all that can be seen or 
communicated of oneself has to be squeezed through the old-fashioned 
keyhole in the door, the figure for language. Wallace’s speaker imagines 
his death will fling open the door:
Think for a second—what if all the infinitely dense and shifting 
worlds of stuff inside you every moment of your life turned out 
now to be somehow fully open and expressible afterward, after 
what you think of as you has died, because what if afterward now 
each moment itself is an infinite sea or span or passage of time 
in which to express it or convey it, and you don’t even need any 
organized English, you can as they say open the door and be in 
anyone else’s room in all your own multiform forms and ideas 
and facets?       
Wallace here reworks Clarissa’s idea in Mrs. Dalloway that, for Septimus 
Smith, “death was an attempt to communicate” (180), and his image of 
an “infinite sea” and the notion that “you don’t even need any organized 
English” also evokes Freud’s pre-and post-linguistic “oceanic feeling,” a 
sense of all-embracing inclusiveness of which the ego is merely a “shrunk-
en residue” (15), and language the ego’s inadequate keyhole. The imagery 
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may also suggest such associations of the ocean with both maternal life-
giving and death-bringing as occur in Ulysses; for Buck Mulligan the sea 
is both “our great sweet mother” (1.80) and “our mighty mother” (1.85) 
in which a man has recently drowned.
 It would be a mistake, however, to think that Wallace merely endorses 
the concept of suicide as communication or holds it up as the ultimate 
anecdotal shock. For him, the extremity of thinking about suicide as a 
form of communication transfers attention from the narrator to the lis-
tener. “Good Old Neon” concludes with the speaker envisioning a for-
mer classmate, “David Wallace,” learning about the narrator’s suicide and 
attempting “to imagine what all must have happened” (180). The story 
ends not by affirming suicide as the sole means of real communication but 
rather by enjoining listeners to take up their own part in a now two-way 
effort to shuttle experience past cliché.5 The listener’s part in this effort 
is truly to listen and to quiet the part of the mind that dismisses experi-
ence as cliché, “the realer, more enduring and sentimental part of him 
commanding that other part to be silent” (181). The suicide in “Good 
Old Neon” is thus another means by which to make the revelation of 
lovelessness new, to command a certain kind of attention from listeners, 
and to compel them to admit the powerful experiences of others past 
their filters for cliché and melodrama.
Heartless structures
Just as lovelessness characterizes the world of “Brief Interview #20,” so 
is it reproduced in the story’s structure. While the story seems to offer 
itself as a space where affect untainted by irony emerges through the law 
student’s revelation of lovelessness, the ironic structures of the story cau-
tion against such a reading. It is more accurate to say that this is a story 
about not having a heart (understood as an emblem for affect) that is 
itself without a heart (understood as a center), because it lacks a stable 
core to ground its own affective meaning. On the one hand, this argu-
ment relies on the coincidence of two different kinds of hearts—heart as 
affective metaphor and heart as structural center—so in some sense the 
reading that follows attempts to make “mere coincidence respectable,” as 
in Thomas Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49, when two forms of entropy, 
thermodynamic and informational, happen to look alike as equations and 
are imaginatively united in Maxwell’s Demon (87). On the other hand, I 
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have been arguing all along that the equation of these two kinds of hearts 
is characteristic of  Wallace’s texts, those Maxwell’s Demons of the heart: 
for Wallace, narrative hearts and sentimental hearts should enable and 
reinforce one another.6 This correlation of hearts also gets reproduced in 
Wallace criticism as when, for instance, Boswell describes the “mysterious 
act of empathy that lies at the center” of “Brief Interview #20” as “the 
story’s true heart” (197). In this formulation, we see how in Wallace’s texts 
affective and structural hearts would beat as one. What remains, then, is to 
show the mechanisms through which, contrary to authorial and critical 
hopes about loving and faithful structural and affective centers, these two 
hearts beat as none.
 The story builds its heartless structure on the gradually revealed 
parallel between the law student and the rapist. Rather than function-
ing as the orienting core of the text, this identity produces vertiginous 
irony, as the law student both invites recognition of and deflects attention 
from this identity. Further, the law student sets a trap for his listener and 
readers in the very place where the heart of this story should be. Where 
the story’s affective heart would be, there is a central vacancy, ensnaring 
readers who think they have found a privileged locus of emotional mean-
ing. Moreover, one might argue sensibly that the law student, and thus 
his entire tale, is already in the grip of an ironic trap set by the woman, 
of which he is completely unaware. The anecdotal nature of the woman’s 
story seems both to provide and deny the story a heart. The cardiac kernel 
pumping blood to all extremities of the story, the anecdote turns out to 
be a faithless heart, traveling from one interpretive structure to the next 
and adhering to several mutually exclusive interpretations simultaneously, 
which even, as I will show, unexpectedly and ironically becomes the very 
condition for love in the story.
 “Brief Interview #20” allows readers to piece together a parallel 
identity between the law student and the rapist so that they seem dis-
tinguished from one another more by degree of predation and violence 
than by kind or type of “hideous man.” This process begins immediately 
in the interview transcript when in response to the first question the law 
student says, “she related an anecdote about hitchhiking and once being 
picked up by what turned out to be a psychotic serial sex offender” (287), 
while, in response to the third question, the law student admits that his 
seduction of the woman at the community festival “was a pickup, plain 
and simple” (288). The kindred signifiers “pickup” and “picked up” sug-
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gest that the law student and murderous rapist are oriented toward the 
woman in a similar way, seeing her as both object and objective. The law 
student, in legalistic idiom claims “nolo to the charge that I spotted her 
on the blanket at the concert and sauntered carnivorously over with an 
overtly one-night objective” (289). 
 “Pickup,” “objective,” and “carnivorous” all suggest that “Brief Inter-
view #20” is less a story of a would-be one-night stand during which an 
anecdote of rape and near murder is related than a story that itself repeats 
or reenacts the anecdote with a difference. This difference is emblematized 
by the law student’s interrupted account of his friend’s view of the woman 
at the festival: “Tad said she was like some kind of smooth blank perfect 
piece of pseudo-art you want to buy so you can take it home and sm—” 
(290). The suspension, mid-word, of “smash” mimics the equivalent tra-
jectories of pickup and abduction and the relative, but not exactly entire, 
aversion of violence in the pickup. 
 This aestheticization and objectification of women is also evident in 
“The Dead,” which similarly approaches but skirts violence. As we have 
seen, Gabriel Conroy imagines Gretta transfigured into a perfect piece of 
pseudo-art, Distant Music, and then into an object of lustful desire. Critics 
have noted the resemblances between Gabriel’s aestheticization of Gretta 
and the Duke of Ferrara’s literal reduction of his last wife to art in Robert 
Browning’s “My Last Duchess.” Norris, for instance, finds in Joyce’s story 
and Browning’s poem a common “appreciation of female beauty that 
resents the life and living feeling of the subject, and therefore proceeds 
to murder the living woman in order that she might perdure as she is 
desired, as pure representation” (102). Bauerle suggests that what Joyce 
describes as Gabriel’s urge to “crush her body against his, to overmaster 
her” (189)—resembles the impulse toward date or mate rape (118). 
 The law student refers to how psychopaths “do not see [their victims] 
as human beings at all but merely as objects of the psychopath’s own 
needs and intentions” (301). Readers of “My Last Duchess” struggle to 
evaluate how much the Duke gives away deliberately or unwittingly; simi-
larly, early in “Brief Interview #20” it is difficult to gauge the extent to 
which the law student realizes the equivalencies between himself and the 
rapist, or how deliberate he is about suggesting them to the interviewer. 
Building a case about the law student’s unconscious relation to the rapist 
and the anecdote he is retelling, the reader will eventually arrive at espe-
cially damning evidence—moments when the law student could just as 
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well be describing himself as the rapist, as when he discusses “the terror 
that any conventional, soul-exposing connection with another human 
being will threaten him with engulfment and/or obliteration, in other 
words that he will become the victim” (303). 
 When the law student eventually shows his hand, we recognize that, 
like the Duke of Ferrara, he may have been in control of the implications 
of his narrative all along:
Nor is this of course all that substantially different from a man 
sizing up an attractive girl and approaching her and artfully de-
ploying just the right rhetoric and pushing the right buttons to 
induce her to come home with him, never once saying anything 
or touching her in any way that isn’t completely gentle and 
pleasurable and seemingly respectful, leading her gently and re-
spectfully to his satin-sheeted bed and in the light of the moon 
making exquisitely attentive love to her and making her come 
over and over until she’s quote begging for mercy and is totally 
under his emotional control and feels that she and he must be 
deeply and unseverably connected.      (303-304)
The law student tries to anticipate at every turn the response of the 
woman who is questioning him and, by extension, the readers’ response 
to the story. “I know I’m not telling you anything you haven’t already 
decided you know” (304), he says, but “Do not think you are getting out 
of me things or admissions I’m unaware of ” (305). You almost expect 
him, like the Duke of Ferrara, to whip out a bronze figure of Neptune 
taming a seahorse.
 The law student certainly attempts to master the meaning of the 
woman’s anecdote by centering it as the supposed heart of the story, but 
we should pause before being persuaded by one whose “candid open-
ness is potentially a trap” (195), as Boswell puts it. Even the congruence 
between seduction and rape the law student patiently builds needs to be 
questioned and qualified, for everything in the story is calculated as a 
snare. Indeed, the story can be viewed as a trap within a trap. There are 
traps for readers set by the self-reflexive narrator, of course, but beyond his 
own otherwise acute awareness he may himself have fallen into a trap set 
by the woman’s “artless” anecdote itself. Our first hint of this possibility 
comes in the initial pickup, during which the woman shows an “amused 
expression during the whole conversation that made it hard not to smile 
588
David P. Rando
in return” (291). This amused expression may suggest that the woman 
perceives not only that the law student wants to pick her up for a one-
night stand (through his artful artlessness about his own artfulness), but 
also that she can deploy a tactic here similar to that which she used effec-
tively in her earlier abduction and rape. Perhaps she already recognizes the 
equivalencies that the law student will only later make to connect himself 
and the rapist. What once saved her life was the ability to create a soul 
connection with the rapist, and now she tells the very anecdote about this 
life-saving soul connection to in effect transform a predatory one-night 
stand into a love relationship, turning the tables on the law student until 
he “feels that she and he must be deeply and unseverably connected.” 
 By emphasizing his interpretive power in relation to the anecdote, 
the law student tries to separate the woman from the power of her story. 
For him it becomes mere raw material for the male consciousness to 
transfigure into a refined epiphany. He sees the story of an objectified 
woman as itself an object, rather than as the complex performance that 
it is. Indeed, despite her apparent artlessness, this woman is remarkably 
able to draw men into emotional connection with her. To take the law 
student’s word about her “fluffiness or daffiness or intellectual flaccidity 
or a somehow smug-seeming naiveté” (289), then, is both to accept his 
limitations as our own and to deny the woman’s anecdote as a meaning-
ful verbal performance even before it is experienced or interpreted as 
epiphanic by a man. Is everybody inside and outside of the story really 
meant to see its correspondences except for the very woman who twice 
is positioned as object and objective, and who, moreover, only chooses to 
tell the anecdote of the first experience during this second experience “in 
response to some sort of prompt or association” (287)? We must consider 
both that the woman has been the active force, telling a powerful story 
in just the right context, rhetorically intervening to make a loveless man 
connect to and love her as more than a silent object, and that the law 
student, despite his own proud self-reflexivity, may not finally understand 
her story, his own, or who has power in both. 
 “Brief Interview #20” demonstrates the way in which the anecdote 
is less like the heart of a single larger story, and more like a peculiar trans-
mitter that bonds for each listener at a different receptor. For the law 
student, the receptor is a love/fear binary common to Wallace’s work. The 
“Good Old Neon” narrator, for instance, defines “two basic, fundamental 
orientations a person could have toward the world, (1) love and (2) fear, 
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and . . . they couldn’t coexist” (164); the narrator’s ex-girlfriend in “Here 
and There” says, “I think feeling like he loved somebody scared him” 
(171). And certainly, “Brief Interview #20” can be read as a story about 
reversing this binary, a character overcoming the terror of connecting with 
another, shedding protective irony, and finally experiencing love: “She had 
all my attention. I’d fallen in love with her. I believed she could save me. 
I know how this sounds, trust me. . . .I knew she could. I knew I loved. 
End of story” (317-18). 
 However, to stop here and to regard the story as having converted 
fear to love, is to obey a No Trespassing sign staked by an author who has 
no authority over interpretative territory. Such a reading overprivileges 
Wallace’s “E Unibus Pluram: Television and US Fiction” (along with his 
interviews) as a kind of manifesto and thus as an interpretive shortcut 
through his fiction. However, not only was this essay written before 
the publication of his best and most mature work, but it is insistently 
predictive and conditional rather than descriptive, as in, for instance, this 
much-cited passage: “The next real literary ‘rebels’ in this country might 
well emerge as some weird bunch of  anti-rebels, born oglers who dare 
somehow to back away from ironic watching, who have the childish gall 
actually to endorse and instantiate single-entendre principles” (81). Evok-
ing that essay, Burn writes, “The only way forward, for Wallace, is to effect 
a break with postmodern practice, and abandon protective irony and risk 
sincerity” (17).7 Boswell argues, “he employs cynicism—here figured as 
sophisticated self-reflexive irony—to recover a learned form of heartfelt 
naïveté, his work’s ultimate mode and what the work ‘really means,’ a 
mode that Wallace equates with the ‘really human’” (17).Despite what 
Wallace might call Boswell’s “flexion of upraised fingers to signify tone 
quotes” (Brief 100), Boswell affirms rather than distances himself from 
Wallace’s formulation, arguing that he “has found that way” (18). None-
theless, as Wallace’s phrase “might well emerge” indicates, his formulations 
are conditional. For too long, critics have seen the principles of  Wallace’s 
manifesto as already manifest in his fiction. 
 It is true that some critics have countered the prevailing view that 
Wallace turns irony against itself to represent sincere emotion. Mary Hol-
land, for example, argues that, in spite of  Wallace’s stated intentions, his 
earnest characters in Infinite Jest are “still doomed, almost sadistically so, 
by an author who cannot overcome his own ironic ambivalence” (220). 
This argument productively questions authorial proclamation, but it re-
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sorts to speculation about the author’s psychological predilections, locat-
ing ironic ambivalence in the author himself rather than trying to reckon 
with the qualities of fictional irony that make Wallace’s own arguments 
against irony untenable. Critics like Charles Harris and Frank Cioffi ar-
gue not that sincere emotion emerges from irony but rather that irony 
continuously qualifies emotion, emphasizing Wallace’s alienation effects 
rather than his affect effects. Infinite Jest, Cioffi writes, “uses alienation 
effects to create its quirky, highly performative world with which the 
reader empathizes but from which she must also withdraw” (162).8 Such 
readings usefully resist the dominant critical axiom, but finally they do so 
simply by reprioritizing the elements of the axiom rather than challeng-
ing the basic formula, emphasizing the ironic over the affective side of 
the equation. In such readings, the opposite of an emotional triumphalist 
is an ironical triumphalist.
 My reading of “Brief Interview #20” has tried to suggest that in Wal-
lace’s work irony and affect are not counterposed but rather thoroughly 
conflated. Affect is not merely undercut or estranged by irony; rather, 
irony is itself a response to the emotion of fear, a kind of affect, while 
ironic or loveless structures emerge as the condition for affect in the first 
instance. The emotional and terminal interpretation of the anecdote that 
the law student would like to enforce is thus only the beginning of its 
significance. Unmediated by any one particular context, the woman’s an-
ecdote continues to operate in virtually infinite possible contexts, within 
and outside of the narrative. An emotional connection is made in the sto-
ry, but Wallace never demonstrates that love overcomes ironic mechanisms. 
Indeed, the connection is not achieved through any exchange of sincere 
sentiment, but rather through a highly complex rhetorical performance in 
which an anecdote is deployed and travels to different receptors for each 
participant. The anecdote connects the characters because it is malleable 
and thus potentially compatible with any number of potential frames; the 
story’s heartless heart, it can become the center of any number of other 
stories yet remains faithful to none. It mediates between people, connect-
ing them not just despite but also because of differences between its initial 
motivation and its variegated interpretations. The anecdote is precisely 
what joins together the law student and the woman, yet they surely do 
not understand her story in the same way. If their relationship is premised, 
each from the perspective of the other, on the “wrong” interpretation of 
the story, has Wallace ever backed away from ironic watching? 
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 “Brief Interview #20” neither transcends irony nor arrives through 
extensive self-reflexive purgation at a final emotional terminus despite 
irony. In it, irony and unironic emotion exist intractably in precisely the 
same space; the affect of love emerges because of the lovelessness of irony. 
Further, emotion and sentiment never overcome or separate themselves 
from irony, despite what Wallace claims in essays and interviews, or what 
critics taking his lead have argued. To maintain that Wallace uses irony to 
overcome irony, creating an “Irony-free zone” (Infinite 369) into which 
sentiment can finally emerge, is to view Wallace’s texts as teleological and, 
with respect to affect, terminal, to the extent that Wallace’s “might well 
emerge” suggests a desired outcome and an end point. However, as “Brief 
Interview #20” demonstrates, irony and affect are locked in an irresolv-
able relationship—irony is a response to affective stimuli while affect is 
predicated upon ironic structures—made more complicated by mutually 
reinforcing layers of loveless story and heartless discourse.
The price of  Wallace’s apple
Wallace’s fictional irony is thus a form of lovelessness that cannot be made 
to love despite what critics or Wallace’s own essays and interviews assert. If 
for Wallace irony is a protective response to fear—the fear of being open, 
sentimental, loving, human, and so on—then Gabriel Conroy, the law 
student, and the narrator of “Good Old Neon” are all figures for the very 
lovelessness of ironic fiction itself. Instead of using irony and fear finally 
to overcome themselves and thus restore love and unironic sentiment 
to fiction, Wallace demonstrates that love and fear are infinitely porous. 
This is why Wallace’s fiction can be so affecting and yet not affective, if 
affective means unironically manifesting sentiment and emotion. The 
source of  Wallace’s attraction is not that he allows weary, irony-saturated 
audiences to finally step back from ironic watching and experience na-
ïve sentiment, but rather that he exposes irony as an integral part of the 
emotional circuit. Wallace is the writer who most vividly demonstrates 
not that his own army of lovers must continually be beaten by a pack of 
infinite jesters, or vice versa, but that the lovers and jesters cannot finally 
be separated out.
 In Wallace’s fiction, there is no return to a pre-ironic state, if ever 
there has been one. Although we have been forced to refer to the woman 
in “Brief Interview #20” simply as “unnamed,” and since we have already 
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encountered a Lilith, let us here take another nominal risk and call her 
Eve. When the law student first sees Eve, “her weight was on one arm 
stiff-armed out behind her and the other hand held the apple—am I 
describing this right?” (313). In a devilish, even serpentine, metafictional 
gesture, Wallace at once signals his recasting of a prelapsarian archetype 
and asks readers to consider whether or not he’s doing it “right,” that 
is, as expected. One thing Wallace has altered, of course, is that this is “a 
supermarket apple with a small supermarket price sticker still affixed to 
it” (311). Like the law student, we watch “with a sort of detached amuse-
ment to see whether she would eat the price sticker without taking it 
off.” The price of the biblical Eve’s apple was Edenic innocence, but if 
this new Eve can eat the price sticker, perhaps she, like the story itself, 
can hope to erase the price of experience. This promise of the return to 
innocence is the very substrate we have been taught by Wallace and his 
critics to identify under his fiction. But nothing would be more ironic or 
experienced than knowingly to swallow the price tag of forbidden fruit. 
Accomplishing that would require a more innocent gesture; Wallace’s Eve 
must eat the price sticker unconsciously, even as the narrator and readers 
look on with detached amusement. Yet the whole structural recasting 
of the loss of innocence is itself inescapably ironic. What fallen reader 
dare back away from ironic watching? Eve may be unconscious, but her 
sitting there as an Eve figure eating a supermarket apple makes her the 
embodiment of irony itself. As in all of  Wallace’s fiction, the question then 
becomes whether irony can be made to appear to unconsciously consume 
irony while readers consciously observe it and the author self-consciously 
looks on. Unfortunately, in this story, the only one who can tell us for 
sure, who can affirm that innocence (or unironic sentiment) really can 
emerge from experience (or ironic fear) is the law student. And now it is 
clear why he must speak the law’s idiom, for the whole story hinges on 
his testimony, which appears sincere and yet ironically is inconclusive: “I 
can’t for the life of me recall whether she ate the price sticker, nor what 
became of the apple at all, whether she discarded it or what” (314-15). 
Notes
1. To add to the views cited above, for instance: Iannis Goerlandt claims that 
Infinite Jest, “explicitly functionalizes the abstract level of ‘superstructure’ . . . 
of poetic texts to counter an ironic reading” (310); Catherine Nichols writes, 
“Wallace turns the carnivalesque against itself to reveal a literary vision that 
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foregrounds the line between transgression for its own sake and the use of art 
for redemptive purposes” (3);Timothy Jacobs likens Infinite Jest to The Broth-
ers Karamazov, described as a “‘novel of belief,’ belief in humanity’s necessary 
ability to confront the darkest aspects of itself and redeem them through lan-
guage” (269); Robert McLaughlin calls Wallace a “post-postmodernist” with “a 
desire to reconnect language to the social sphere or, to put it another way, to 
reenergize literature’s social mission, its ability to intervene in the social world, 
to have an impact on actual people and the actual social institutions in which 
they live their lives” (54); and James Rother similarly historicizes Wallace as 
part of “a third generation . . . whose quiet revolution in the realm of fictional 
technique has scrapped deadpan irony” (216). There are, of course, dissenting 
views and I discuss some of these below.
2. While Joyce seems consciously to battle cliché and melodrama in “The 
Dead,” Wallace writes in the aftermath of Joycean techniques of epiphany, 
which have themselves come to seem clichéd and melodramatic. Thus Wallace’s 
self-consciousness about cliché and reader response also necessarily applies 
to understated Joycean epiphany, for even epiphanic shock can become trou-
blingly recursive in the “fashionable modern minimal exercise, going through 
its weary motions as it slouches toward epiphany” (“Westward” 359).
3. Wallace is particularly deft in choosing Lilith from Cheers for his narrator’s 
undoing, as the name evokes Eve’s powerful predecessor.
4. Ironically, as in all of the interviews in Brief Interviews with Hideous Men, 
readers are not permitted to hear the interviewer’s questions, only the inter-
viewee’s response, so the interviewer is already silenced on the level of dis-
course while the law student attempts to silence her on the level of story.
5. To write about Wallace representing suicide as communication is necessarily 
to raise the issue of  his own suicide. What it may or may not have commu-
nicated to those who cared about Wallace is a topic that has merited and will 
continue to merit its own discussion. Here I only note that Wallace’s suicide 
also shifted emphasis from Wallace as speaker to his readers, readers who are 
forced “to imagine what all must have happened.”
6. I am grateful to one of the anonymous readers of this article for pointing 
out another instance in which heart and center are indeed conflated. In the 
2009 film, Agora, the astronomer Hypatia rationalizes her belief in a center of 
the universe by saying that if there isn’t a center, it would break her heart.
7. More recently, reviewing Consider David Foster Wallace, Burn writes, “There’s 
little doubt that Wallace exhibited a remarkable and voracious intellect, but a 
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near-deification has allowed him to define the terms of his own critical recep-
tion too completely” (467).
8. Similarly, Harris argues that, “Having it ‘both ways,’ Wallace attempts in his 
fiction to recuperate what he calls ‘single-entendre principles’ . . . while at the 
same time employing defamiliarizing techniques associated with postmodern-
ism to remind his readers that not only the book they are reading but, in cer-
tain fundamental ways, the world they inhabit are made out of language” (173). 
Indeed, Harris makes explicit what has perhaps remained implicit in my read-
ing: Wallace never lets readers forget that the naïve emotions (signifieds) that 
they believe they discover in Wallace’s texts are finally signifier effects.
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